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 Chapter 4 
 The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate 
on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France 
 Patrick  Simon 
4.1  Introduction 
 A researcher or a journalist trying to compare the situation of ethnic and racial 
minorities in the United States and in France immediately confronts a crippling 
obstacle. The concept of ‘ethnic and racial minority’ as such is not used in France. 
This is not simply a matter of vocabulary –something the French typically like to 
argue about; the problem rather lies in the very incomparability of populations that 
one is talking about. Many of the categories that do exist in political discourse and 
public debate can of course be found in statistics. But there are no data describing 
the situation of minorities in France that could be compared with those produced in 
the United States. This state of affairs in French statistics – gathering has been the 
subject of major criticism for some 20 years now; it has gotten to the point that it has 
triggered a controversy of rare violence between those that would like to see statis-
tics take into account the diversity of the population and those who denounce the 
danger that such statistics might pose of ethnicizing or racializing society. The 
media focus on the contentiousness of this debate has been such as to sometimes 
lose sight of the very existence of discrimination and the fl aws of the Republican 
model that are at the root of the controversy in the fi rst place. 
 For more than a century and a half, the census has been recording the nationality 
and the country of birth of individuals, variables that have been used to distinguish 
foreigners from Frenchmen (citizens) and immigrants from natives. The statistics 
have served the special institutional purposes of managing immigration. They were 
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designed to perform a model of integration according to which immigrants would 
gradually lose their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness as they progressed on the 
path to citizenship. There was no need, therefore, to distinguish among French citi-
zens on the basis of their origins: a political credo was believed to be tantamount to 
a sociological truth. Hence the descendants of immigrants have remained invisible 
to quantitative research. The idea of a hyphenated Frenchman (as in ‘French- 
Algerian,’ for instance) acquired no political or social legitimacy (Simon  2005b ). 
With the passage of time it became possible to claim that ‘statistical identities,’ and 
their colour-blindness or ‘ethnicity-blindness’, served to erase the heritage of immi-
gration and reinforce assimilation into the nation. 
 Such invisibility therefore occupies a central position in the French political and 
legal framework, since it is supposed to ensure equality of all before the law and, 
consequently, in social life. Equality through invisibility – if we were to summarize 
the Republican strategy into a slogan – requires that ethnic and racial divisions not 
be represented. The credo of indifference to differences – the French colour-blind 
approach – leads to promoting what I would call the choice of ignorance by remov-
ing any reference to ethnic or racial origin from policies or laws – in compliance 
with the Constitution 1 – as well as from statistics. Nevertheless, such a strategy 
reaches its limits with the growing spread of the categories of ‘race’ and ethnicity in 
public debates, political addresses, representations conveyed by the media and in 
social reports. The omnipresence of references to ethnicity and race reminds us that 
while France is offi cially a society without ‘race,’ racism and racial discriminations 
are as widespread as anywhere else. No one would contest the fact that the absence 
of the offi cial use of ethnic or racial categories fails to curb the spread of prejudice 
and stereotypes. 
 The virulence of such prejudice and its translation into countless instances of 
discrimination, insult or humiliation based on ethnic or racial origin have for a long 
time been trivialized, ignored or straightforwardly denied. The main result of the 
social and statistical invisibility of ‘race’ and ethnicity may well have been to con-
ceal the extent of discrimination. Be that as it may, since around the year 2000 dis-
crimination has become a major political issue, and all the more so after the riots of 
November 2005 made the crisis of the French integration model obvious to every-
one. Contributing too to this growing awareness have been the struggles, which 
have come to saturate the political arena, over recognizing the memory of slavery 
and the weight of the colonial past. In a return of the repressed of unprecedented 
proportions, controversies over the nature and extent of the colonial legacy 2 and the 
appearance on the public scene of organizations – such as the  Indigènes de la 
République [Indigenous People of the Republic], a name  repeating the label given 
1 Article 1 of the Constitution of 1958 thus stipulates that ‘France is an indivisible, secular, demo-
cratic and social Republic. It ensures equality before the law of all citizens regardless of origin, 
race or religion.’ The question whether, with this phrase, the Constitution prohibits creating statis-
tics referring to origin is not cut-and-dried. See the discussion later in this article on the recent 
decision by the Constitutional Council about the use of ‘ethnic statistics.’ 
2  ‘Qui a peur du post-colonial?’  Mouvements 51 (September  2007 ). 
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to the colonized people in the French colonial empire or the CRAN ( Conseil 
Représentatif des Associations Noires [Representative Council of Black 
Associations]) – speaking on behalf of ‘racial’ or racialized minorities, have come 
to challenge the strategy of ignoring differentiation and the colour-blind character 
of the Republic itself. 
 In this context, the issue of statistics has emerged to crystallize confl ict. Hence, 
the unusual passion that takes hold of researchers, political leaders, antiracist asso-
ciations, the media and, now, heads of companies when they bring up the question 
of ‘ethnic statistics.’ Initially a confi dential topic confi ned to the circles of demog-
raphers and statisticians, the debate over what type of statistics to use to analyze 
discrimination has rapidly moved into the public sphere where it transformed into a 
violent controversy. The ‘controversy of the demographers’ began in 1998–1999 in 
what turned out to be only a fi rst phase in a cycle of emotionally charged confronta-
tions (Stavo-Debauge  2003 ; Spire and Merllié  1999 ). In the short term, the status 
quo was preserved. References to the Jewish fi les from the Vichy period and invoca-
tions of risks of various kinds of persecution seemed to disqualify the very idea of a 
revised approach. But the debate recently started up again with the creation of new 
initiatives for the fi ght against discrimination. The needs have become more press-
ing and a pragmatic approach to the issue seems to be replacing the ideological 
debates. Methods that provide an alternative to the creation of ethnic categories are 
being proposed: audit studies (known as ‘testing’ in French), the use of proxies, 
small sample surveys, etc. This article will address more specifi cally (1) the catego-
ries currently in use and their limitations; (2) the arguments exchanged and the 
justifi cations mobilized to support or reject ‘ethnic statistics’; and (3) the alternative 
methods used and their limitations. As one of the protagonists involved in this 
debate, I cannot claim to be absolutely impartial in the presentation of the different 
arguments: some of them to me seem more convincing than others. I will try, how-
ever, to avoid caricature and to offer a fair rendering of this difference of opinions 
on what may be the main challenge all multicultural democracies are facing today. 
4.2  The Categories of Public Statistics 
 Rejected as scientifi c and legal concepts, ‘race’ and ethnicity were never codifi ed in 
France as categories in offi cial statistics, save for just two exceptions related to spe-
cial legal defi nitions: colonial statistics (which referred to the indigenous status of 
colonial subjects), and the ‘racial’ registration of Jewish people by the Vichy regime, 
inspired by the classifi cation used by the Nazis. The racial category of ‘Jewish’ was 
removed from the offi cial texts in 1944 and gradually disappeared from statistics . 3 
3 A controversial debate broke out in the 1980s when data going back to the war were found in the 
police and gendarmerie fi les. It all started after Serge Klarsfeld discovered a fi le in the archives of 
the minister of war veterans that looked like it could have been the ‘Tulard File,’ named after the 
Prefect of Seine in the 1940s who had coordinated the census of the Jewish people in the department. 
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Conversely, colonial categories have lasted longer in the census carried out in 
Metropolitan France. To understand current debates, it is useful to take a brief look 
at the history of the categories ‘French by acquisition’ [ Français par acquisition ] 
and ‘French Muslims’ [ Français musulmans ]. 
 From 1891 to 1999, the categories produced and used by offi cial statistics were 
remarkably stable: they were limited to three categories of citizenship status – 
‘French,’ ‘French by acquisition,’ and ‘foreigners’ (Simon  1998 ). Some major 
 variations were nevertheless noted; they were related to the nomenclatures used and 
the tabulations published in the census volumes. The categories selected by public 
statistics to describe immigrant populations seemed to stay within the framework of 
legal nationality. Nevertheless, by identifying immigrants who were ‘naturalized,’ 
they refl ected by way of comparison an ambiguous notion of citizenship. Whereas 
by law there is practically no difference among French citizens based on the mode 
of acquisition of their nationality, the method by which it was acquired has been 
recorded since 1871 and was used in a number of detailed works between 1926 and 
1946. The desire to learn about and to monitor the naturalization process, which was 
devised as the touchstone of the French assimilation model, led to creating and 
applying the category of ‘French by acquisition’ as an  ordinary component of the 
population. The importance given to the ‘French by acquisition’ shows above all 
that statistics are not simply a refl ection of self-evident administrative categories but 
are constructed in response to issues of public policy. An understanding of the 
reasons why people came to be registered as ‘French by acquisition’ thus reminds 
us that the objective has been, in the words of the INSEE, ‘to study the assimilation 
of foreigners within the French population’ and ‘to analyze and compare the 
 demographic and social characteristics of the various components of the population 
as a whole.’ 4 
 The new classifi cation of the colonial subjects of the French empire, who inher-
ited a system in which nationality and citizenship not always coincided, also shows 
all the ambiguities of the ‘colonial Republic’ (Bancel et al.  2003 ). Indeed, the situ-
ation of ‘indigenous’ residents of the French colonial empire was always the subject 
of special codifi cation in the territories under French administration. A special 
classifi cation was adopted in Algeria whereby, despite extending French citizenship 
to all the inhabitants through the Organic Law of 1947, the distinction by status 
(civil or personal, which was defi ned on a mix of racial and religious criteria) was 
The fi le turned out not to be that one. On this ‘Jewish File’ issue see Joinet L. (1991) ‘Affaire dite 
du ‘Fichier des Juifs,” in CDJC  Le statut des Juifs de Vichy , Paris, CDJC and (Rémond et al.  1996 ). 
4  The introduction to the 1946 census volume entitled ‘Population of Foreign Origin: Naturalized 
Persons and Foreigners’ provides the following argument: ‘The questions relative to nationality 
that are raised in the general census must make it possible to answer three concerns: to know the 
distribution of the population in France among French people and foreigners, to study the assimila-
tion of foreigners into the French population, to analyze and compare the demographic and social 
characteristics of the various components of the population as a whole. […] Thus, it would be 
desirable to study in full the issue of the assimilation of foreigners, in order to be able to classify 
people based on their situation with respect to the legislation on the acquisition of French national-
ity.’ (INSEE  1953 : 305). 
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preserved (in Article 3). The category of ‘French Muslims’ was thus born from the 
juxtaposition of the criterion of citizenship and the personal status of Muslim (Kateb 
 2001 ). Yet, while the census applied in Algeria, a French department, used a nomen-
clature including the various statuses, this was obviously not the case in metropoli-
tan France, where there had been no mention of personal status in the standard 
census form. This then compelled the census services to come up with an original 
encoding rule which, to my knowledge, has never had any equivalent. To restore the 
distinction by personal status, ‘people born in Algeria who also have an Arabic or 
Berber sounding fi rst and last name’ were classifi ed as ‘Muslims native of Algeria’ 
and those with a ‘Christian or Jewish fi rst name’ as ‘French-born natives of Algeria.’ 5 
The classifi cation of names was based on a list provided by the Statistics of Algeria. 
 The same principle was applied in 1962, when Algeria had just acceded to inde-
pendence. And in fact, how was one to recreate a division by nationality that did not 
exist in reality when fi lling out a questionnaire? While it would have been logical to 
group natives of Algeria by reference to their nationality (French or Algerian), it 
was decided at the time to preserve the inherited distinction by personal status. Once 
again, this was done based on people’s fi rst and last name. As a result, the categories 
describing migrants from Algeria grew in numbers: French-born repatriates, French 
Muslims who elected to preserve their French nationality, French Muslims who had 
become Algerian. And indeed, the 1968 census did shed some light on things inso-
far as the tables presenting the distribution of natives of Algeria were now based on 
their current nationality. One table was nevertheless still used exclusively for natives 
of Algeria other than repatriates (of metropolitan French ancestry, according to the 
classifi cation used), which placed together the 85,520 ‘French Muslim natives of 
Algeria’ and the 471,020 Algerians. Finally, a classifi cation as ‘natives of Algeria’ 
supplemented the category of ‘Algerian repatriates,’ which were defi ned by exclud-
ing Algerian nationals and ‘French Muslims.’ 
 Whereas nomenclatures contribute to establishing an accepted division of soci-
ety, the information selected by an offi cial institution and circulated through pub-
lished tables serves to legitimize the categories in use. The publication of the tables 
on foreigners or ‘naturalized persons’ was quite irregular: sometimes, there were 
detailed monographs; sometimes, data were practically non-existent. However, gen-
erally speaking, the volume and the nature of the tables used refl ected, as did the 
classifi cations used, the public offi cials’ preoccupations with immigration. From 
1926 to 1946, censuses appeared every 5 years (though with a hiatus in 1941) in 
which more than 350 pages of tables presented in detail the major characteristics of 
foreigners and naturalized persons in France as a whole and by department. These 
reports included extensive details on occupational activity. This particular treatment 
of foreigners and naturalized persons was abandoned between 1954 and 1968, a 
period during which the category of ‘French Muslims’ appeared provisionally. The 
census of 1968 then inaugurated a new era in the use of the ‘nationality’ variable. 
5  Excerpt from the encoding instructions, Annex 2, General census of the population of 1962, 
INSEE. It is not known what decisions were made when people had an Arabic or Berber fi rst name, 
but a different sounding last name. Perhaps there was never such a case. 
4 The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France
70
Once the shock of the decolonization was more or less absorbed, there was a revival 
of interest in foreigners, whose numbers had kept on growing since the beginning of 
the 1960s – hence the special attention given to them in the census, as well as to 
Algerian repatriates and to the various groups of population identifi ed on the basis 
of their place of birth. But the main rupture came with the introduction of national-
ity in the construction of tables on households and housing. At fi rst timid (8 tables 
in 1968), this focus became systematic and routine after 1975. From then on, nation-
ality became one of the major category variables, alongside sex, age or socio- 
occupational category. Its widespread use as a legitimate descriptor and signifi er of 
the individual or the household thus announced and accompanied the articulation of 
immigration as a public issue. The censuses of 1982 and 1990 continued along this 
path by giving an important place to foreigners and to French people by acquisition, 
distinguishing them on the basis of previous nationality and place of birth. Finally, 
the category ‘immigrant’ (with a meaning close to ‘foreign born’) appeared in the 
census of 1999. 
 In fact, the primacy of the division by nationality in statistics extended from the 
census to almost all quantitative surveys and administrative fi les. Thus, until the end 
of the 1980s, immigrant populations were almost always classifi ed in the binary 
categories of French and foreigners; details on the main nationalities were some-
times provided. Most often, a distinction between ‘EEC foreigners’ and ‘non-EEC 
foreigners’ was used to present a breakdown of individuals, households or families, 
and was included as an annotation in the fi les. These are the categories that were 
used, and still are, in a good number of cases, as proxies for populations that ana-
lysts tend to grasp in a completely different manner. To summarize the state of sta-
tistics available in France today, it is easy to obtain tables on foreigners or immigrants 
based on the census, not so often in administrative statistics, and in several surveys 
‘second generations’ are identifi ed. At the same time public debates bring up immi-
grants and talk about ‘Blacks,’ ‘Arabs,’ ‘Maghrebians,’ or ‘youth descendants of 
immigrants.’ The gap between the statistical categories and the terms used in every-
day discourse is huge. 
 And yet, in the last two decades, a certain number of changes have been intro-
duced in a rather discrete manner. The 1990s saw the spreading of the category of 
‘immigrants’ that is fairly close to that of  foreign born as used in the United States. 
Validated by the  Haut Conseil de l’Intégration [High Council on Integration] in its 
fi rst report (HCI  1991 ), this category was soon systematically included in the pro-
duction of statistics by the INSEE ( Institut National de la Statistique et des Études 
Économiques [National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies]). Then the 
 Histoire Familiale [Family History] survey, 6 teaming up with the census of 1999, 
included for the fi rst time in a survey of this magnitude information on the country 
of birth of parents. At that point the descendants of immigrants turned into a statisti-
cal category, almost 20 years after they became part of public debate and media 
coverage. It seemed credible to assume that this classifi cation would quickly become 
widely used. This option seemed to offer a strong tactical response to the critics 
6  380,000 persons surveyed. 
P. Simon
71
calling for better data to describe discrimination, and it avoided taking the further 
step of adopting ethno-racial classifi cations via self-identifi cation. Data on parents’ 
place of birth, however, involves limitations that I will examine in detail in the third 
part of this article, though such limitations, from a political point of view, may be 
largely offset by the possibility that this category of data could offer an exit from the 
cycle of endless controversy that has arisen over so-called ‘ethnic statistics.’ 
4.3  The Controversies on ‘Ethnic Statistics’ 
 A year before the census of 1999, a violent controversy erupted in the French press 
over rumours of a plan to introduce ethnic categories in the census questionnaire. 7 
Amid a blaze of press articles, the controversy pitted a number of researchers, on the 
one hand, ready to denounce the idea as part of a drift toward racism, against a few 
researchers, on the other, who called for modifying the statistical system, and in 
particular by substituting the category of immigrant for foreigner. The controversy 
was fuelled by the criticism of the ‘ Mobilité Géographique et Insertion Sociale ’ 
[Geographic Mobility and Social Integration] survey coordinated in 1992 at the 
National Institute for Demographic Research ( Institut National d’Etudes 
Démographiques or INED) by Michèle Tribalat (Tribalat  1995 ). The use of native 
language to distinguish among the various native African ‘ethnic groups’ or among 
the native ‘Arabophones’ and ‘Berbers’ of Algeria and Morocco, and fi nally the 
introduction of the concept of ‘ethnic belonging’ in the analysis of the survey were 
the object of virulent attacks (Blum  1998 ; Le Bras  1998 ). The controversy between 
Michèle Tribalat and Hervé Le Bras, both researchers at INED became highly per-
sonalized. The media portrayed it as a battle between a ‘taboo breaker’ and a pro-
moter of a Republican rhetoric of  colour blindness (Stavo-Debauge  2003 ). When 
this fi rst controversy ended, the status quo had prevailed, and the statistical appara-
tus remained unchanged. The episode did, however, deepen mistrust of how the 
managers of administrative fi les and of those at the INSEE handled variables having 
to do with immigrants. In the years that followed, the state statistics apparatus, over-
whelmed by an ethical responsibility often poorly understood, practiced an exces-
sive degree of self-censure, applying to any classifi cation involving these variables 
conditions of validity that were more stringent that those worded by the data protec-
tion authority. What resulted were greater limitations on access to information 
showing the nationality or the country of birth of individuals (theoretically allowed, 
but heavily controlled in reality). The choice of censure before the fact in order to 
avoid any negative usage directed toward immigrant populations continues to be the 
favoured strategy to this day. 
7  The INSEE unions had sounded the alarm and obtained media coverage. An examination of the 
proposed changes to the census questionnaire shows however that no request to introduce ethnic 
categories was ever made. The existence even of a ‘plan’ in this sense has not been established. 
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 When the controversy resumed in 2004, the political context had changed com-
pletely. Discrimination had found its way onto the political agenda (Fassin  2002 ). 
The issue of statistics no longer concerned only the sphere of social scientists; it had 
become a political issue (Simon and Stavo-Debauge  2004 ). The desire to make 
discrimination more conspicuous created more pressing needs for statistical data. 
References to skin colour or to ‘visible minorities,’ an expression borrowed from 
the Canadian debates, had become omnipresent. While there was a large consensus 
on the need to fi ght against discrimination, the role of statistics in policy and policy- 
making was the subject of contrasting views. Two petitions published within less 
than a month of each other advocated opposing positions. In the fi rst one – 
‘ Engagement républicain contre les discriminations ’ [ Republican commitment 
against discrimination] , published in the daily  Lib é ration on February 23, 2007 – 
the signatories defended the idea that it was possible to fi ght against discrimination 
effectively by using currently available statistics and limiting oneself to audit stud-
ies. The dangers of ethno-racial categorization were put forward to justify the use of 
alternative methods presumed to be operational so as to avoid the creation of ‘ethnic 
statistics.’ Sponsors of the petition sought to defend the ‘Republican model,’ wor-
ried as they were about the risk of sliding into inter-ethnic confrontations and drift-
ing into affi rmative action [ discrimination positive ] on behalf of discriminated 
minorities. As a reaction to this petition, a manifesto was then published in the daily 
 Le Monde. 8 The signatories – the author of these lines being one of them – did not 
propose adopting a predefi ned set of categories; rather, they called attention to the 
defi ciencies of current statistics as a basis for pursuing an antidiscrimination policy. 
They argued that given the systemic discrimination that occurs in France, as in any 
other multicultural and post-colonial society, the use of accurate statistics was an 
indispensable tool and that the alternative methods proposed by opponents met nei-
ther the needs of knowledge nor those of political action. 
 Because the stakes in this controversy clearly have gone beyond what is custom-
ary in scientifi c and technical debate, the exchanges have attracted a great deal of 
media coverage, which in turn has made them all the more violently polemical. 
Concepts or principles of analysis are not the only matters involved: the opponents 
of ‘ethnic statistics’ have rather sought to intervene, in the name of science, against 
what they see as a political danger. Mixing ends (the fi ght against discriminations) 
and means (the racialization of statistics), they are concerned that the constitutive 
power of statistics might strengthen ethnic or racial boundaries. It should be under-
scored that the controversy has not been about the nature of the fi ndings that studies 
have presented on the situation of ‘immigrant populations’ or their descendants in 
French society. Few critics have challenged the analysis of the educational or pro-
fessional trajectories of these groups such as have been made in those rare studies 
that do make use of categories of origin. Generally speaking, most researchers who 
criticize the idea of ‘ethnic statistics’ do not do research on discrimination. Their 
criticism grew mainly out of an ‘epistemological’ point of view in the social sci-
ences – an ‘epistemology’ that in fact was less concerned with the conditions of 
8  ‘Des statistiques contre les discriminations’,  Le Monde , March 13, 2007. 
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knowledge and the establishment of ‘facts’ than with a desire to fl ag political and 
moral dangers. Most of these critics have not bothered to formulate concrete pro-
posals for alternative categories. 
 Even though located in different political contexts, the controversies raise some-
what similar arguments. Taken together, the principal texts written against ‘ethnic 
statistics’ show recurrent topics that could be summarized as follows:
 1.  The use of ‘ethnic variables’ for scientifi c purposes revives the debate on the 
scope of the prerogatives public statistical services should be allowed to have 
and on their responsibility in structuring the social fi eld. From this perspective, 
one can fear that by looking into the ‘origins’ of individuals the bodies collecting 
statistical information might violate their privacy. And what about respect for the 
rule law? Is an inappropriate use of the records, for political or other purposes, 
really that inconceivable? The precedent of recording information on Jewish 
people during Second World War and the ethno-racial profi ling practiced, even 
today, by police and other institutions (including public housing bodies) are evi-
dence of the reality of that risk. Despite an extremely rigorous control of the 
management of electronic fi les by the CNIL, an authority with relatively broad 
powers, the possibility of abuse cannot be excluded. 
 2.  Ethno-racial classifi cations contribute to an essentialization of identities, relegat-
ing individuals to origins that cannot change or be transcended. These classifi ca-
tions tend to substitute for other forms of identifi cation that may be just as viable 
and socially relevant, if not more so, such as class or gender. Essentialization and 
over-determination thus make the use of these categories extremely problematic. 
Researchers concerned about their social responsibilities would better refrain 
from using racist stereotypes in their work. 
 3.  Even when ethnic or racial categories are not referring to ‘objective’ defi nitions 
of origin, but are based on an identifi cation that leaves room for the actors to play 
a role in defi ning them, there is a risk of reifying blurred, unstable entities. By 
tracking data, the statistical classifi cation generates boundaries within the social 
body, where previously there was only a loose conglomeration of moving identi-
ties. Statistics result in rigid ethnic and racial frontiers and validate common-
place prejudices. 
 4.  The use of ‘ethnic statistics’ to fi ght against discrimination is not justifi ed; it is 
possible to reveal discrimination through ethnographic observations or special 
surveys instead of statistical data gathering. Audit studies and indirect methods 
of classifi cation, such as the use of fi rst names, may make it possible to obtain 
comparable results while avoiding the collection of ‘ethnic data.’ 
 Obviously, the set of arguments called upon to disqualify the use of the concepts 
of ‘race’ and ethnicity and their operationalization in statistical categories play upon 
a variety of rhetorical registers. In debates, the opponents of ethnic statistics easily 
shift from one register to the next, mixing what pertains to the logic of political 
action with what is more a matter of scientifi c method. One of the main rhetorical 
tricks, for example, consists in lumping together statistics and preferential quotas. 
Because the idea of ‘positive discrimination’ is quite unpopular in France, many 
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people all too readily assume that ‘ethnic statistics’ would only serve to ensure the 
creation of quotas for ‘Blacks’ and ‘Arabs’ seeking access to universities and jobs. 
The principle of ensuring equality of treatment through monitoring is still not very 
well understood. Most arguments, then, against ‘ethnic statistics’ share the common 
feature of exploiting the fear of a slippery rope by invoking apocalyptic forecasts of 
what will follow. 
 One sees this mode of argument in the reference to the Vichy government’s per-
secution of Jewish populations during World War II. This criminal misappropriation 
of statistical fi les is now historically well established and its signifi cance should not 
be underestimated. However, a distinction should be made among the various types 
of statistics a government might collect. Inquiries based on anonymous samples are 
not censuses and should not be confused with population registers or administrative 
fi les. In a remarkable study, William Selzer ( 1998 ) has shown that while the depor-
tations of Jewish people by the Nazis and the governments collaborating with 
Hitler’s regime were facilitated by the use of demographic statistics, it was mostly 
the population registers (specifying names), not the census, that had turned out to be 
most useful in carrying out the Final Solution. To be sure, the Nazis themselves 
routinely performed administrative registration in the occupied countries, as an 
early step in the perpetration of mass murders. In the Second World War, moreover, 
even democratic countries were not immune from abusing statistical records, as was 
the case with the use of the census in the internment of Japanese Americans (Selzer 
and Anderson  2001 ). 
 Another problem with the risk-of-persecution argument is that it may be applied 
to a large number of ‘sensitive’ data that are already routinely collected for purposes 
of redistributing resources or correcting social ills. Most social policies involve a 
whole series of statistics that have to do with characteristics inducing disadvantages, 
and for this reason, run the risk of reinforcing stigma: single-parent families, need- 
based scholarship recipients, the unemployed, the disabled, and so on; the list is 
long. The only viable guarantee that these data will only be used for legitimate 
purposes is provided by the state and by the data protection authority. But should the 
state be trusted? The negative answer implicitly given to this broad question is pre-
cisely what determines for the most part the hostility encountered by the creation of 
ethnic categories. This characteristic mistrust of the state clearly distinguishes 
France from many other countries in the North of Europe (Great Britain, Scandinavia, 
the Netherlands, etc.) 
 The use of ethnic or racial categories for purposes of research, or even more so 
for targeting public policy, could create the illusion that it substitutes essentialist 
distinctions for socially constructed defi nitions of difference. In reality, however, 
the main currents in the fi eld of race and ethnic studies have clearly distanced them-
selves from the essentialist tradition. The concepts of ethnicity or of ‘race’ that are 
dominant today in the academy are constructivist in inspiration (Brubaker  2009 ). 
The recent plea of the American Sociological Association in favour of collecting 
‘racial’ data through the federal statistical apparatus unequivocally testifi es to that 
conviction (ASA  2003 ). The ASA’s statement, entitled ‘The Importance of 
Collecting Data and Doing Social Scientifi c Research on Race,’ argues that to 
P. Simon
75
 invalidate popular beliefs in the existence of ‘biological races’ the social effects of 
the circulation of racial classifi cations and prejudices must be studied. In this con-
text, abandoning racial classifi cations would amount to precluding the understand-
ing of one of the fundamental forms of social stratifi cation in the United States, 
and – as a consequence – failing to grasp some of the most important mechanisms 
that produce inequality. 
 It is also unconvincing to argue that a focus on ethnic and racial inequality would 
displace or impede efforts to address socio-economic inequality. For a long time a 
great many studies have sought to fi nd ways to understand the connections between 
‘race,’ gender, and class without getting trapped into this fallacy. The role of the 
researcher is not to defi ne a hierarchy of contemporary forms of domination, but 
instead to consider their plurality and describe their evolving confi gurations. In 
France, by contrast, where the very notions of ethnic origin and ‘race’ have been 
discredited, it is assumed these categories should not under any circumstances be 
exploited, even for the positive purposes of aiding individuals. Since racial catego-
ries are produced by racial thought, the idea itself of a reappropriation giving a 
certain prestige to the derogatory identity by the person who suffers it (reversing of 
stigma) is unconceivable. This line of reasoning is probably what most radically 
differentiates the United States and Great Britain from France: ‘race’ and ethnicity 
are regarded as self-evident in the fi rst two countries; they are seen as nothing but a 
historical creation that needs to be eradicated in the case of France. A compromise 
between these alternative perspectives could probably be found. One may well won-
der whether the negation of minority identities that prevails in France in the name of 
universalism is not often simply a tactic for consolidating the position of dominant 
groups. At any rate, it is striking to note that through some sort of pernicious effect 
of the universalistic logic the fi ght against ethnic and racial inequality leads to a 
deepened mistrust of any mention of origin, as if origin had become shameful in 
itself, a defamatory mark that should be erased as swiftly as possible. 
 Contested with respect to their substance, statistics involving ethnicity or ‘race’ 
are also contested with respect to their form. Whereas the variables of nationality 
and country of birth reproduce civil status data and are thus relatively easy to col-
lect, the data regarding ethnicity and ‘race’ – when left without an institutional defi -
nition – are by nature subjective and changing. The corresponding categories are 
thus potentially unstable, likely as they may be to evolve under the effect of identity 
claims or changes in equality policies. It is, however, precisely from these limita-
tions that the singular value of ‘ethnic and racial’ categories are derived; these are 
categories that constitute in reality – to cut against the grain of a hackneyed argu-
ment – the paradigmatic example of a non-essentialist classifi cation system, since 
subjectivity is incorporated in their very defi nition. In this sense, they represent a 
new generation of quantitative data where ‘authenticity’ is less important than the 
possibility of recasting the principle and the content of categorization as a matter for 
debate. Because they claim to be subjective and fragile, because they assume their 
inscription into a history made up of slavery, colonization, xenophobia, exploitation 
and domination, because they prevent an evasion of what lies buried in the struc-
tures of our formally egalitarian but highly hierarchized societies, ‘ethnic and racial’ 
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statistics have the power of revealing historically crystallized relationships of power. 
The use of a self-identifi cation method makes room for the dynamics of representa-
tion, imposition and interiorization of labels to emerge. If the self-identifi cation of 
persons prevails – as is the case almost everywhere today – it will also make it pos-
sible to measure the acceptance and interiorization of current labels. More gener-
ally, this registration method based on choice opens the door to a kind of ‘statistical 
dramaturgy’, through which the confl icts and competition – between majorities and 
minorities and within these groups – characteristic of ethnic and racial relations in 
multicultural societies get refl ected in the classifi cation operations themselves. 
 Granted, there remains a gap between the logic of self-identifi cation and the 
fundamental basis of discriminatory practices: the perception that others have of the 
origin of individuals (third party identifi cation). This ascribed identifi cation and its 
determinants call for a sociology of appearances and markers (patronymic, linguis-
tic, body posture, etc.). It is diffi cult to reduce this complexity so as to make it fi t 
with traditional data collection practices. But an awareness of the inherent limita-
tions in data collecting should not lead to depriving ourselves of statistical tools 
built on self-identifi cation, imperfect though those tools may be. A number of stud-
ies show that there is a relatively close convergence between the classifi cations 
established by third parties and those chosen by the individuals themselves, 9 or at 
least a suffi cient convergence to make self-identifi cation effective for the purpose of 
defi ning populations likely to be discriminated against because of their presumed 
‘race’ or ethnicity. 
 Let us close this discussion of the case against statistics by looking at the termi-
nological pitfalls that beset the Francophone world. While the terms race, ethnic 
group or ethnicity could not be more commonly used in English-speaking countries, 
they are highly charged objects of criticism in France. 10 That being the case, could 
we use other signifi ers instead of ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ that would still preserve the 
meaning that has been attributed to them? A detour through geography, ‘culture’ or 
national origin, however, raises some delicate issues. The notion of ‘culture’ is 
scarcely more consistent (nor less controversial) than that of ‘ethnicity,’ since using 
it tends to attribute explanatory power to the most obvious ‘cultural’ features (nota-
bly language and religion) at the expense of more political and social dimensions of 
ethnicity. As for geography, which postulates the primacy of a territorial relation-
ship and sees migration as the founding event of ethnicity, its relevance – already 
debatable but plausible with respect to immigrants – is more than doubtful with 
respect to their descendants. For them ethnicity has less to do with a continuous tie 
to a territory or national origin than with an individual’s socialization in the family 
and in the educational milieu (communalization, to borrow a concept from Weber). 
It is a matter more of history than geography. Indeed, the debate over ‘ethnic statis-
tics’ is itself best understood in light of the very special relation the Republican 
model has to history. The diffi culty in taking into account, much less overcoming, 
9  For France, see (Simon and Clément  2006 ). 
10  On the registers of meaning of ‘ethnic’ or ‘ethnic group’ see (Krieg-Planque  2005 .) On the choice 
to talk about ‘racist discrimination’ or ‘racial discrimination,’ see (De Rudder et al.  2000 ). 
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colonial history as well as the way immigration has been managed by the Republic 
remain at the core of the controversy over statistics – at its core, but never fully 
acknowledged. 
4.4  The Search for Alternatives: Replacements and Placebos 
 Collecting ethnic data is not only a political question, it is also a legal issue framed 
within the restrictions of the data protection law that was adopted in 1978 and 
amended in 2004. Article 8 of that law stipulates as follows:
 It is prohibited to collect or process data of a personal nature that reveal, directly or indi-
rectly, the racial or ethnic origins, the political, philosophical or religious opinions, the 
union membership, the health or the sexual life of persons. 
 This ban can be lifted under certain conditions. Therefore there is no blanket 
prohibition, but rather a prior check over what may be done. As a result, surveys that 
attempts to ask questions related to ethnicity and ‘race’ in their questionnaires are 
extremely rare. 
 However, this legal framework regarding the collection of data has been sub-
jected to signifi cant criticism by researchers and, more recently, by the companies 
that wish to implement monitoring with a view to fi ghting discrimination and pro-
moting diversity. Faced with repeated and growing pressures, on July 9, 2005 the 
French Data Protection Authority ( Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés, 
or CNIL) 11 issued its fi rst formal recommendations on the ‘measurement of diver-
sity.’ In them, the authority leaves it to the legislature to decide whether ‘nationwide 
ethno-racial nomenclature’ ought to be created, while acknowledging that statistics 
referring to origins are legitimate in the context of the fi ght against discrimination. 
These fi rst recommendations produced no effect and the pressures grew stronger. 
Calls to establish a framework for using ‘diversity statistics’ grew signifi cantly and 
came from many different sectors of society. In turn, the French High Authority 
against Discrimination and for Equality ( Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les 
Discriminations et pour l’Egalité , or HALDE) declared its opposition to any ‘ethno- 
racial nomenclature,’ arguing that it was suffi cient in fi ghting discrimination to have 
data on the country of birth of individuals and their parents and to carry out audit 
studies. 12 
 The hostility of the HALDE towards any ‘ethnic monitoring’ carried out by com-
panies for antidiscrimination purposes led the CNIL to reconvene a task force on the 
issue of measuring diversity. After several months of conducting hearings of 
researchers, representatives of anti-racist associations and human rights advocates, 
members of institutions, ministers and members of Parliament – some of which 
11  The CNIL is an independent authority created by the Data Protection Law of 1978 (amended in 
2004) to ensure its application. 
12  Decision 2006-31 of February 27, 2006. 
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were held in front of the press, the CNIL issued a new report on May 16, 2007. This 
report contains ten recommendations that open the door to a well thought-out col-
lection of ‘ethnic and racial’ data as part of carefully supervised surveys, as well as 
to the collection of data that might be useful in analyzing how people ‘experience 
discrimination.’ 13 The CNIL also conveyed that it was open to introducing the coun-
try of birth and nationality of parents into the census. 
 To widespread surprise, these recommendations inspired the fi ling of an amend-
ment on ‘studies on the measurement of the diversity of origins’ in a legislative bill 
on immigration control, which Parliament examined in September 2007. Several 
anti-racist associations and the socialist party criticized the amendment, either for 
its content or for its insertion in a bill on immigration which was acutely discrimina-
tory in itself. The HALDE and CNIL, however, supported it. 14 After having been 
slightly modifi ed by the Senate, the bill was offi cially approved on 23 October 2007. 
On this occasion, the HALDE issued a press release reconfi rming its opposition to 
the creation of offi cial ‘ethnic statistics’ while at the same time accepting the pos-
sibility of using ‘ethnic’ categories in scientifi c studies. 15 Yet, ultimately, the 
Constitutional Council accepted the claim put forward by a large number of left- 
wing members of the parliament that the provision in the law authorizing the collec-
tion of data on race and ethnicity was unconstitutional. That provision, whose raison 
d’être was paradoxically to strengthen the power of control of the data protection 
agency, was nullifi ed as a result, primarily on the ground that it was a rider devoid 
of any connection with the object and purpose of the law into which it had been 
inserted (regulating immigration and redefi ning the conditions under which foreign-
ers could reside in France). Yet, the Council also took it upon itself to add a state-
ment on the unconstitutional nature of any data collection process that would rely 
on race or ethnic origin, described as a violation of article 1 of the 1958 Constitution. 
What the consequences of this decision will be is diffi cult to say for now. 
 For the time being, the political and legal constraints on ‘ethnic statistics’ have 
stimulated are sourcefulness in terms of methods and makeshift solutions. Rather 
than collecting data on origin by asking a direct question, such data is deduced from 
indirect information: last and/or fi rst name; country of birth and nationality of the 
individual, a person’s parents or even grandparents; native language or language 
spoken at home. 16 Taken separately or combined, these variables enable one to 
build categories that, after all, are not much different from ‘ethnic categories’ but for 
13  The entire report of the CNIL, as well as a verbatim of the hearings are available at  http://www.
cnil.fr/index.php?id=2219 . 
14  See the CNIL press release on its website; also see the platform published by its president Alex 
Turk and Anne Debet, rapporteur for the task force on the measurement of diversity (Debet and 
Turk  2007 ). 
15  Decision 2007-233 of 24 September 2007. See the following excerpt : ‘The high authority under-
scores that the use of such inquiries should not result in the creation of ‘ethno-racial categories’ and 
cannot under any circumstances justify the use of offi cial fi les referring to, directly or indirectly, 
the origins of people.’ 
16  For an inventory of the data available and of the different approaches and problems encountered, 
see the publication of the Strategic Analysis Council ( Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, or CAS  2006 ). 
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their indirect and derivative nature. These replacements or proxies underscore, by 
contrast, the ambiguities of statistical invisibility: some solutions could seem even 
more reifying than the categorization that they claim to be avoiding. In a good num-
ber of cases, they turn out to be less reliable. It is often surprising to fi nd that the 
terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘race’ have the effect of the bogeyman, but when all is said and 
done, no one really knows what they are about. 
 The main strategy applied to make up for the unavailability of ethnic categories 
consists in collecting information with similar or equivalent meaning. In particular, 
the interest in descendants of immigrants has favoured the use of questions on 
nationality and parent’s country of birth (Simon  2003 ). The 1999  Histoire Familiale 
survey, the 1993 and 2003 FQP 17 surveys, the employment survey 18 since 2005 and 
the 2006 housing survey 19 make it possible to analyze the situation of the descen-
dants of immigrants. Eurostat chose this option when it introduced such data in the 
questionnaire of the forthcoming 2008 European labour force survey. Yet, while the 
study of the ‘second generation’ plays a crucial role in the analysis of the integration 
process, it is far from clear that the category of descendants of immigrants is the 
most appropriate for looking into ethnic and ‘racial’ social relationships. Easy to 
collect and accommodate in the French context, the category offers a pragmatic 
compromise in the short term, but it is bound to become obsolete with the next gen-
erations. In the case of France, the oldest waves of immigration go back to the 
middle of the nineteenth century. It would be impossible to describe the situation of 
the descendants of Belgian, German, Polish, Armenian or Italian immigrants who 
came prior to 1940 based on the ‘second generation’ category. For the most recent 
waves, which are also those that are truly exposed to discrimination, the criterion 
of the country of birth of the parents still allows one to cover between 80 and 90 % 
of the populations concerned (Simon and Clément  2006 ). Yet, within the next 
10 years, the subsequent generation will reach the age of social autonomy and no 
longer be identifi able in statistics. The transition to recording origin by self- 
identifi cation will then be the only viable solution. 
 Another option involves identifi cation based on already recorded markers. Thus, 
fi rst and last names constitute basic information recorded as part of the individual’s 
(civil) identity and can be classifi ed into quasi-ethnic categories based on what 
they sound like. This seemingly simple method can be applied to any administra-
tive fi le. And even though these individual data are protected by the CNIL, which 
theoretically limits their use for statistical purposes, this approach is at the heart of 
a growing number of studies on segregation or discrimination. Applied to French 
National Education fi les (Felouzis  2003 ; ORES  2007 ), to corporate fi les (Cédiey 
and Foroni  2005 ) or to judiciary data (Jobard and Névanen  2007 ), the ‘patronymic 
method’ undeniably yields results. To be sure, we have no precise measurement of 
the magnitude of the observational biases involved in relying on fi rst name choices. 
But if we assume that in most cases fi rst names given by parents are chosen from a 
17  Formation et Qualifi cation Professionnelle , approximately 40,000 persons sampled. 
18 Approximately 55,000 persons were polled in 1 year. 
19 Approximately 30,000 persons sampled. 
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culturally limited list, they can be considered as markers of ‘cultural origin’ 
(Felouzis  2003 : 420) and can therefore be used to track and measure the segrega-
tion or discrimination of the people with the relevant names. 
 The decision to use the fi rst name, last name, or a combination of the two, how-
ever, is fraught with consequences. Even though it is always possible to change 
one’s name, either through a special procedure, or through marriage, a patronym is 
in fact a lot more stable than a fi rst name (Lapierre  1995 ). Conversely, the latter is a 
wonderful sociological signifi er that enables one to uncover the effect of collective 
norms on personal choices, in particular in the case of immigrant families faced 
with the contradictory processes of acculturation, on the one hand, and reproduction 
of marks of attachment to their culture of origin, on the other. Thus, as a marker a 
fi rst name is not independent from the very social processes that it is being used to 
measure, namely the integration process and exposure to discrimination based on 
origin. The choice families make to give or not to give a culturally marked fi rst 
name cannot be isolated from strategies of social mobility or  invisibilization [blend-
ing in]. Studies on Hispanics in the United States come to this conclusion (Sue and 
Telles  2007 ), as does most notably one of the few quantitative studies dedicated to 
the fi rst names of children of immigrants (Valetas and Bringé  2005 ). Based on the 
MGIS survey conducted in 1992, M-F. Valetas and A. Bringé show that while 
Algerian immigrant parents choose a ‘traditional’ fi rst name in ¾ of cases, their 
descendants born in France, i.e., the second generation of Algerians will prefer 
‘international’ (38 %) or ‘French’ (22 %) fi rst names for their children and will 
gradually abandon the ‘traditional’ (20 %) or ‘modern Maghrebian’ (20 %) fi rst 
names. The disappearance of ‘typical’ fi rst names as well as the assimilation through 
name change is at the root of claims by Hispanic lobbies that led to the introduction 
of the Hispanic question in the United States census in 1980. Until that date, 
‘Hispanics’ were reclassifi ed based on their fi rst and last names by the departments 
of the Census Bureau. Based on the conclusion that persons of Hispanic origin were 
potentially underrepresented due to mixed unions and the expansion of Anglo 
names in the Hispanic community, the lobbies requested and obtained the introduc-
tion of the question of Hispanic origin by self-identifi cation (Choldin  1986 ). 
 Finally, the effi ciency of the patronymic method as part of the observation of 
discrimination processes is far from being established. The assumption under which 
a fi rst and last name constitute a signifi cant signal on the basis of which potential 
discriminators direct their behaviour is in part confi rmed by the audit studies that 
have been carried out in recent years. A good deal of discrimination, however, 
occurs without the perpetrators knowing the civil identity of the persons that they 
discriminate against. And what about individuals who are exposed to discrimination 
due to a ‘visible’ sign of their origin in interpersonal interaction but who do not have 
a fi rst or last name that would denote such an origin? These types of discrimination 
remain undetected by a method that is based on patronymic identifi cation. And are 
descendents of immigrants or people from the overseas departments [DOM] who 
have blurred the signal usually delivered by a ‘typical’ fi rst name shielded from 
discriminations based on other distinctive signs? Obviously not. 
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 Those limitations notwithstanding, does the use of fi rst names at least make it 
possible to avoid the much-dreaded ‘ethnicization of statistics’? In this respect, the 
arguments made are not exempt of hypocrisy. In fact, and despite all the carefully 
selected words for the occasion, 20 the construction of a category of persons ‘with an 
Arabic fi rst name’ (or ‘Maghrebian’ fi rst name) makes sense in relation to a uni-
verse of ethno-cultural reference that is constitutive of patronymic semantics. An 
‘Arabic’ fi rst name is a classifi cation criterion only because it is correlated with the 
alleged belonging of the person with such name to a group defi ned as Arab. The fact 
that origin is attributed based on a fi rst name does not necessarily correspond to the 
self-identifi cation of the persons thus classifi ed, as Cédiey and Foroni rightly note 
( 2005 : 9). Nor does it prevent the ‘Arabic fi rst name’ from being an ‘ethno-racial’ 
characteristic based on collective stereotypes. As a matter of fact, one cannot easily 
escape from stereotyping. Stereotypes are at the root of discrimination and therefore 
they will certainly surface when one tries to monitor it. 
4.5  Antidiscrimination as a New Political Frame 
 The issue of discrimination fi nally found its place on the political agenda at the end 
of the 1990s in France, after having for a decade been the subject of a growing num-
ber of research studies and publications (Fassin  2002 ). Compared with the scholarly 
output in North America or Great Britain, the interest in French social sciences was 
certainly very slow in coming. This situation has been all the more paradoxical 
because works on racism as an ideology were relatively numerous and, given how 
long a history France had with immigration, discrimination was hardly a new phe-
nomenon (Amiraux and Simon  2006 ). But it does not suffi ce for the facts to exist to 
automatically become topics of research or intervention by state authorities. 
 Following the 1996 report by the  Conseil d’État [Council of State] on the prin-
ciple of ‘equality,’ the 1998 report by the High Council for Integration ( Haut Conseil 
à l’Intégration ) on the ‘fi ght against discrimination’, and Minister of Employment 
and Solidarity Martine Aubry’s speech before the Council of Ministers on October 
21, 1998 proclaim equality to be the key element in the revitalization of French 
integration policy, the fi ght against discrimination has become part of the French 
political agenda. Two EU directives introducing the notion of indirect  discrimination 
20  See for instance this passage from the very interesting study on access to higher education in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais based on a classifi cation by fi rst name: ‘Attributing a certain ‘ethnic origin’ to 
students here is out of the question. The debates on this concept are suffi ciently old and rich to 
admit that a fi rst name is only one of many more or less reliable indicators.’ (ORES  2007 , p.7) In 
a context where ‘ethnic’ studies have come to be seriously stigmatized, the authors have felt com-
pelled to apologize for their identifi cation approach and go as far as to claim that their classifi cation 
does not attribute an ‘ethnicity’ to students ‘with Arabic or Muslim fi rst names’. What, then, does 
this category based on fi rst names stand for? 
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into European law were adopted in June and November 2000. 21 They were trans-
posed into French law by the Law of November 16, 2001 and supplemented in 
January 2002 by the Law on social modernization. In 2004, the HALDE succeeded 
the Group to Study and Combat Discriminations ( Groupe d’Étude et de Lutte contre 
les Discriminations , or GELD), which had been created in 2000. The list of matters 
covered by the HALDE is now identical to those listed in the European directive on 
equality in employment and therefore includes sex, religion, handicap and sexual 
orientation, in addition to ethnic or racial origin. Between 2000 and 2005, the public 
system of antidiscrimination law enforcement was thus gradually set up, but has 
been largely unable to effectively tackle what is more akin to a discriminatory  sys-
tem or  order than to a succession of isolated cases. 
 The structural dimension of discrimination is clearly acknowledged by European 
law, which has sought to sanction not only direct discrimination but also those forms 
of indirect discrimination that are more diffuse and are captured by the more socio-
logical concept of systemic discrimination. Indirect discrimination is defi ned in 
Article 2 of the European Directive as ‘an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice likely to entail a specifi c disadvantage for persons of a given race or ethnic 
origin compared to other persons, unless such provision, criterion or practice can be 
objectively justifi ed by a legitimate objective and the means to reach such an objec-
tive are appropriate and necessary.’ By now this defi nition ought to be a standard 
reference in French law, but the concept has not been fully appropriated by legal and 
non-legal actors. The main stumbling block for putting this legal principle to use is 
precisely the lack of a system of categories and of the necessary statistics (Calvès 
 2002 ). France in fact was sanctioned in June 2007 by the European Commission 
with a request for a ‘reasoned opinion’ – the second and fi nal degree of sanction 
prior to notifying the European Court of Justice – for its incomplete incorporation 
of the concept of indirect discrimination. 
 Indeed, the concept of indirect discrimination itself presupposes the availability 
of statistical monitoring. Indirect discrimination is assessed essentially through its 
consequences, and those can only be grasped through statistical comparisons 
designed to ascertain whether a given practice has what in American legal parlance 
is known as a ‘disparate impact.’ Unjust and unfavourable treatment does not con-
sist solely in refusing to grant goods or services on account of a person’s sex or 
origin. The question of intent is not decisive in determining whether discrimination 
is involved. A set of procedures and decisions, none of which is, strictly speaking, 
discriminatory, could end up fi ltering individuals in a suffi ciently regular manner 
(but never completely – this is what separates discriminatory systems of this type 
from apartheid models) based on their origin without its author even consciously 
trying to produce that result. 
21  Directive 2000/43/EC of 6/29/2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between per-
sons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, known as the ‘race directive’; Directive 2000/78/EC ‘for 




 Likewise, so-called ‘positive action’ measures, designed to promote equality, use 
statistics abundantly for diagnostic purposes, to set objectives, or to evaluate the 
effects of policy (Simon  2005a ). Based upon complex monitoring systems, these 
antidiscrimination policies only rarely use quotas to establish equality. Statistics are 
used mainly to track impediments to advancement or access, identify their internal 
mechanisms and measure the progress made in overcoming them. The objective is 
to enforce equality of treatment, rarely to grant preferential treatment to persons 
considered to belong to an ‘ethnic or racial’ minority. The regulative ideal at play 
here remains the impartiality of resource allocation systems, of their selection pro-
cedures and conditions of access. Yet, in the French debate, these positive action 
models are routinely described as being nothing more than preferential policies 
based on racial or ethnic quotas, which are extremely unpopular in public opinion. 
Quotas are then described as the inescapable end point of the establishment of sta-
tistical monitoring, in spite of the fact that the two same things are clearly distinct. 
The equation ‘ethnic statistics = quotas’ has thus become one of the most common-
place claims in the controversy, despite all attempts to correct this fallacy and to 
explain what is really involved in the policies promoting affi rmative action and 
equal opportunity. This persistent effort to caricature policies designed to fi ght 
against discrimination arises in part from ignorance, but also from a deliberate strat-
egy to discredit them in order to justify political and scientifi c choices. From this 
point of view, the debate on ‘ethnic statistics’ is far from being a model of intellec-
tual rigor. 
 All in all, research in the social sciences, and especially in the fi eld of statistics, 
is called upon to describe society not as researchers would like it to be but as it has 
come to be shaped by social relationships and political and institutional forces, in 
order to understand its dynamics and fi nd the tools necessary to transform it. To 
carry out such a program, it is important to defi ne proper questions for research and 
to devise methods for tackling them. It is essential to remember, too, that ‘ethnic’ 
categories are by no means unique in their fragility and in the fuzziness of their 
boundaries. Such properties simply require the statistician or researcher to explore 
the subjective dimension of classifi cations, even in the case of variables that appear 
to be the most stable and reliable. To take just one example, some of the critiques 
frequently levelled at ‘ethnic statistics’ could easily apply to socio-occupational 
categories (about the variation in survey responses that fail to correspond to objec-
tive changes in status, the imposition of categories that fail to capture the diversity 
of personal experiences, and so on). Occupational categories have problems, too, 
then, but this does not mean we have to challenge their existence. 
 Developments in the fi ght against discrimination have gradually led to calling 
into question the ‘choice of ignorance’. This is no longer only a debate among spe-
cialists. The diversity charter, 22 the promotion of diversity in the public service, 23 
diversity in the media: the calls and recommendations to introduce visible differ-
ence in the social makeup of organizations and their hierarchies are growing in 
22  The Diversity charter has been signed by close to 1500 companies since 2004. 
23  ‘Rapport sur la diversité dans la fonction publique’, Dominique Versini, December 2004. 
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numbers. Companies that have taken the initiative to ask the CNIL about the autho-
rized methods for collecting data ‘relating to diversity’ are breaking new ground. 
The debate is far from theoretical. Directors of human resources are asking a prag-
matic question: How to measure discrimination without identifying the groups 
likely to have suffered it? The HALDE in turn has taken a position against the 
establishment of ‘ethnic’ statistics while at the same time being open to targeted 
surveys. For the time being, it remains committed to a defence of audit studies as an 
alternative method to statistical monitoring. 
 In fact, the French strategy does not conform to the guidelines issued by the 
international bodies. The recommendations of the CERD 24 to the UN (Banton 
 2001 ), of the ECRI to the Council of Europe, 25 or those of the EUMC 26 in Vienna 
aim at promoting the collection of statistical data that show, one way or another, 
ethnic and racial origins. In its last report 27 to the European Council and the European 
Parliament on the application of Directive 2000/43/EC, the European Commission 
noted the critical role statistics have played in the implementation of antidiscrimina-
tion policies and the strengthening of their ability to ensure social cohesion and to 
promote diversity equitably. It also underscores the persistent misunderstandings, 
sometimes deliberately entertained, that surround the relations between data protec-
tion and the production of statistical information on discrimination. As the report 
put it, ‘The rarity of ethnic data in most member states can, however, hinder the 
proper monitoring of the application of European community legislation.’ 
 Objections have been raised to the collection of this type of data on the grounds 
that they presumably violate provisions of the European Union directive on data 
protection. This argument, however, is not quite correct. The directive prohibits in 
general the treatment of sensitive data of a personal nature. Some exceptions to this 
rule are nevertheless allowed, notably when ‘the person concerned has granted 
explicit consent for such treatment,’ or when ‘the treatment is necessary for the 
purpose of respecting the obligations and special rights of the person responsible for 
such treatment in terms of labour law.’ In addition, ‘subject to appropriate guaran-
tees, member states can allow exceptions on grounds of major public interest.’ 
Therefore, member states are responsible for deciding whether ethnic data must be 
collected to produce statistics with a view to fi ghting discrimination, provided that 
the guarantees established by the directive on data protection are respected. 28 
 On a European scale, France is not the only country to experience diffi culties in 
becoming involved in an effective equality policy. The controversies regarding sta-
tistics are nevertheless a lot more passionate there than elsewhere because of the 
place occupied by immigration, colonization, and slavery in the national history. 
The special role of the researchers in social sciences in these controversies is also 
24  Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale/Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. 
25  European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. 
26  European Monitoring Center on Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism. 
27  COM (2006) 643 of 10/30/2006. 
28  COM (2006) 643 of 10/30/2006. 
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exceptional in France. For a long time, reminding researchers of their civic duties 
was aimed at building awareness about the dangers that were thought to be inherent 
in the development of ‘ethnic’ statistics (Noiriel  2006 ). The collective blindness and 
silence that prevailed on racial discrimination were not perceived to be a matter of 
collective responsibility. That being said, it is obvious today that the  choice of igno-
rance no longer protects the populations exposed to discrimination; on the contrary, 
it reinforces the system that puts them at an unfair disadvantage. This is indeed the 
meaning of the latest interventions by sociologist Dominique Schnapper, who until 
very recently had embodied the ideal-typical republican position in the fi eld of inte-
gration research. She says now that ‘taking ethnic categories into account will grad-
ually happen in France as in the democracies of northern Europe,’ since it is 
‘impossible, politically and morally, for researchers to renounce their role in the 
creation of the self-awareness of a democratic society by establishing knowledge 
that is as objective as possible’ (Schnapper  2007 : 99). Assuming, however, that this 
French exceptionality among multicultural societies is indeed fast disappearing, the 
joint agenda of research and public decision on the issue of discrimination has only 
begun. What should ‘ethno-racial’ categories look like, how and where could they 
be collected, and according to which procedure would the categories be defi ned: 
there is a new research frontier that awaits us beyond the controversies and carica-
tures that have come with the ‘choice of ignorance.’ 
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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